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In an action for wrongful death of a small child, plaintiff offered
evidence that -by an experiment it was found that a child dressed in
deceased's clothing could be seen from locomotive for a distance of
600 to 1,200 feet from place where the accident occurred. Held,
inadmissible, since it was not shown how or when deceased reached
the track or where she had been immediately before the accident.1
Experimental evidence may be introduced if circumstances are
shown to be the same2 or essentially the same3 at the time of the event
and of the experiment, and the witnesses do not have to be experts
except where technical knowledge is required.4 The burden of prov-
ing that the circumstances were the same is upon the proponent,5
after laying the foundation.6 Time, 7 place,8 and the seasons 9 may
be considered in determining this similarity. Admissibility of such
evidence is discretionary with the trial judge,' 0 and subject to review
only in case of abuse ;11 but trial judges are cautioned by expressions
'Neice v. Norfolk and Western R. R. Co., 154 S. E. 563 (Va. 1930).
'Langham v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 197 Iowa 1118, 198 N. W. 525
(1924) ; Going v. N. & W. R. R., 119 Va. 543, 89 S. E. 914 (1918) ; Owen v.
Delano, 194 S. W. 756 (Mo. App. 1017). Cf. State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646
(1876), and Cox v. R. L, 126 N. C. 103, 35 S. E. 237 (1900).
'St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Kimbrell, 117 Ark. 457, 174 S. W. 1183
(1915) ; Arrowood v. R. R., 126 N. C. 629, 36 S. E. 151 (1900) ; Zimmer v.
Fox, 123 Wis. 643, 101 N. W. 1099 (1905).
'Arrowood v. R. R., supra note 3. Bystander can testify. Hallawell v. Oil
Co., 36 Cal. App. 672, 173 Pac. 177 (1918). Fact that person making experi-
ments knew what he was looking for does not render evidence incompetent.
Henderson v. R R., 132 Va. 297, 111 S. E. 277 (1922).
'Riggs v. M. St. Ry. Co., 216 Mo. 304, 115 S. W. 969 (1909). But the duty
of going forward with the evidence may shift, as where circumstances make a
prima facie case. May Dept. Stores v. Runge, 241 Fed. 575 (C. C. A. 8th,
1917).
' Omaha St. Ry. Co. v. Larson, 70 Neb. 591, 97 N. W. 825 (1903) ; N. & W.
Ry. v. Sollenberger, 110 Va. 606, 66 S. E. 726 (1909).Brewing Co. v. Ice Co., 156 N. Y. S. 410 (1915); Dow v. Bulfinch, 192
Mass. 281, 78 N. E. 416 (1906).
"Henderson v. R. R., supra note 4. The place where the experiment is
made is immaterial, as long as conditions are essentially the same. Olivaros
v. San Antonio Ry. Co., 77 S. W. 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
'Range Co. v. Vanderford, 217 Ala. 342, 116 So. 334 (1928).
" Beckley v. Alexander, 77 N. H. 255, 90 At]. 878 (1914) ; May Dept. Stores
v. Runge, supra note 5. This discretion does not extend to preliminary proof
of similarity of conditions. Amsbary v. R. R., 78 Wash. 379, 139 Pac. 46
(1914).
" Augusta Ry. & Electric Co. v. Arthur, 3 Ga. App. 513, 60 S. E. 213
(1908) ; City of Manchester v. Beavers, 38 Ga. App. 337, 144 S. E. 11 (1928) ;
Konald v. Rio Grande Ry. Co., 21 Utah 379, 60 Pac. 1021 (1900). The evi-
dence may be so clearly relevant and material as not to be within the discretion
of the trial judge to receive or reject it. May Dept. Stores v. Runge, supra
note 5.
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in at least two opinions to be wary of permitting experiments at the
trial itself, which though permissible when made outside, might con-
fuse the jury when made in court.12
Experiments are most often employed in cases involving acci-
dents caused by railroads, automobiles, etc.,' 5 cases involving defects
in appliances or in construction,14 cases in which chemical analyses
figure, 15 cases involving the range of sight and hearing,' 0 and in cases
where it is necessary to determine personal responsibility for death.17
The following cases illustrate the application of the above prin-
ciples and the difficulty of simulating actual conditions in an experi-
ment: Defendant was indicted for rape of a young girl in a dark
room which she shared with her mother. The mother testified that
in the struggle defendant fired a pistol and that she recognized him
by the flash. Defendant insisted that the jury be instructed to retire
into a darkened room and ascertain whether defendant could be rec-
ognized by the gun-flash. Held, Not allowed, since the same cir-
cumstances could not be reproduced as a foundation for the experi-
ment.' 8 In another case, a suit for divorce, defendant offered evi-
'Jumpertz v. People, 21 Ill. 375 (1859); Spires v. State, 50 Fla. 121, 39
So. 181 (1905).
'Henderson v. R. R., supra note 4 (railroad); Panhandle R. R. v. Hay-
wood, 227 S. W. 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (railroad); Truva v. Rubber Co.,
124 Wash. 445, 214 Pac. 818 (1923) (auto); McCarthy v. Curry, 240 Mass.
442, 134 N. E. 339 (1922) (machinery).
" Boston Hose and Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N. E. 657
(1901) (explosion of boiler); Bona v. Auto. Co., 137 Ark. 217, 208 S. W. 306
(1919) (defects in steering-gear); Smith's Adm'x v. Electric Co., 164 Ky. 46,
174 S. W. 773 (1915) (defect in transformer); Kimball Bros. Co. v. Gas and
Electric Co., 141 Ia. 632, 118 N. W. 891 (1908) (motor test); Leonard v.
Southern Pacific Co., 21 Ore. 555, 28 Pac. 887 (1892) (defects in bridge).
Guinan v. Lasky Corporation, 167 N. E. 235 (Mass. 1929) (explosive
quality of motion picture film) ; Heal v. Fertilizer Works, 124 Me. 138, 126
At. 644 (1924) (quality of fertilizer); Hershiser v. Railroad, 102 Neb. 820,
170 N. W. 177 (1918) (blood test); Graustein v. Wyman, 250 Mass. 290, 145
N. E. 450 (1924) (Babcock test) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Reagan, 15 Ga. App.
571, 84 S. E. 69 (1915) (distinguishing between gasoline and kerosene).
" Meaney v. Power Co., 282 Pac. 113 (Ore. 1929) (visibility); Klenk v.
Klenk, 282 S. W. 153 (Mo. App., 1926) (visibility); Nelson v. R. R., 208
Mass. 159, 94 N. E. 313 (1901) (surveying); Harper v. Holcomb, 146 Wis.
183, 130 N. W. 1128 (1911) (shooting by mistake for deer); Kansas City
R. R. v. Hall, 152 S. W. 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (visibility of coal chute);
Lasityr v. City of Olimpia, 61 Wash. 651, 112 Pac. 752 (1911) (lighting
effects); Smith v. Insurance Co., 234 Mich., 119, 208 N. W. 145 (1926) (dis-
tance person may be recognized at night) ; Gambrill v. Schooley, 95 Md. 260,
52 Ati. 500 (1902) (distance voice will carry).
" Huestis v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 131 Minn. 461, 155 N. W. 643 (1915)
(experiment with gun); Tackman v. Brotherhood, 132 Ia. 64, 106 N. W. 350
(1906) (experiments with rope) ; Jumpertz v. People, supra note 12 (experi-
ment with door hooks).
"Spires v. State, supra note 12.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
dence that plaintiff's stenographer, at her desk in adjoining room, saw
a woman sitting in plaintiff's lap. Plaintiff offered as evidence an
experiment to show that from where she was sitting the stenographer
could not have seen him. Held, Inadmissible, since it was not proved
that the furniture was in the same position as at the time of the
event.1 9 In an action for the wrongful death of a child in a railroad
accident, plaintiff offered an experiment in evidence to show that
defendant's engineer, when he saw an object upon the track, should
have recognized it as a child from a point distant 1,200 feet. Held,
Admissible, because, in the experiment, it was shown that the cir-
cumstances upon which the evidence was predicated could be sub-
stantially reproduced, since it was proved that the engineer actually
saw the child on the track.20
In the principal case, the necessary foundation for the experi-
ment could not be laid and, therefore, the ruling in the case was
correct.
CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR.
Landlord and Tenant-Effect of Consent to One Assignment of
Lease on Condition Not to Assign-Dumpor's Case.
A 1931 opinion1 of the Supreme Court has ushered onto the
North Carolina juristic stage the English case of Dumpor v. SymnW2
decided in 1603. In Dumpor's Case a condition that the lessee and
his assigns would not convey the lease without special license from
the lessor was held to have been extinguished, when one such license
was given. This holding is obviously contrary to a common sense
interpretation of the given transaction. The court based its decision.
on precedent, but it has been shown that the authorities were invoked
by false analogy.3 Dumpor's Case is no longer the law in England,4
but its doctrine continues to prevail in several American jurisdic-
tions.5
"Kuenk v. Klenk, supra note 16.
Henderson v. R. R., supra note 4.
'Childs v. Warner Bros. Southern Theatres, Inc., 200 N. C. 333, 156 S. E.
923 (1931).
24 Coke 119 (1603).
'Dumpor's Case (1873) 7 AM. L. Rnv. 616, 623.
' The following statutes nullified the rule in Dumpor's case: 22 and 23
Vicr. c. 35, §1 (1859) and 23 and 24 Vicr. c. 38, 6 (1860).
'Reid v. Weissner & Sons Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234, 40 Atl. 877 (1898);
Pennock v. Lyons, 118 Mass. 92 (1875) ; Aste v. Putnam Hotel Co., 247 Mass.
147, 141 N. E. 666 (1923) ; Murray v. Harvey, 56 N. Y. 337 (1874) ; see Ger-
man Am. Savings Bank v. Gollmer, 155 Cal. 683, 102 Pac. 932, 934 (1909).
